



OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL MODERNIZATION COMMISSION
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMITTEE

THURSDAY, APRIL 9, 2015
9:30 A.M.
OHIO STATEHOUSE ROOM 018

AGENDA

- I. Call to Order
- II. Roll Call
- III. Approval of Minutes – Meeting of March 12, 2015
[Draft minutes attached]
- IV. Presentation

“House Joint Resolution 2 – Congressional Redistricting”

Rep. Kathleen Clyde
Ohio House of Representatives

[House Joint Resolution 2 attached]
- V. Reports and Recommendations
 - A. Article II, Section 2 (Election and Term Limits State Legislators – Option One)
 - Second Presentation
 - Public Comment
 - Discussion
 - **Action Item: Consideration and Adoption**
[Report and recommendation attached]

B. Article II, Section 2 (Election and Term Limits State Legislators – Option Two)

- Second Presentation
- Public Comment
- Discussion
- **Action Item: Consideration and Adoption**

[Report and recommendation attached]

VI. Committee Discussion

Senate Joint Resolution 1 – Public Office Compensation Commission

[Senate Joint Resolution 1 attached in Part II]

[Legislative Service Commission Analysis of Senate Joint Resolution 1 attached in Part II]

[Memorandum by Hailey C. Akeh titled “Comparing State Compensation Commissions”, dated March 2, 2015, attached in Part II]

VII. Old Business

VIII. New Business

IX. Public Comment

X. Adjourn

As Introduced

**131st General Assembly
Regular Session
2015-2016**

H. J. R. No. 2

Representatives Clyde, Curtin

**Cosponsors: Representatives Antonio, Smith, K., Stinziano, Leland,
Driehaus, Bishoff, Johnson, G., Celebrezze, Ashford, Fedor, Lepore-Hagan,
Sheehy**

JOINT RESOLUTION

Proposing to enact Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 1
and 9 of Article XIX of the Constitution of the 2
State of Ohio to revise the redistricting process 3
for congressional districts. 4

Be it resolved by the General Assembly of the State of 5
Ohio, three-fifths of the members elected to each house 6
concurring herein, that there shall be submitted to the 7
electors of the state, in the manner prescribed by law at the 8
general election to be held on November 3, 2015, a proposal 9
to enact Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of Article 10
XIX of the Constitution of the State of Ohio to read as 11
follows: 12

ARTICLE XIX 13

Section 1. (A) The Ohio redistricting commission shall 14
be responsible for the redistricting of this state for 15
congress. The commission shall consist of the following 16

seven members: 17

(1) The governor; 18

(2) The auditor of state; 19

(3) The secretary of state; 20

(4) One person appointed by the speaker of the house of 21
representatives; 22

(5) One person appointed by the legislative leader of the 23
largest political party in the house of representatives of which 24
the speaker of the house of representatives is not a member; 25

(6) One person appointed by the president of the senate; 26
and 27

(7) One person appointed by the legislative leader of the 28
largest political party in the senate of which the president of 29
the senate is not a member. 30

The legislative leaders in the senate and the house of 31
representatives of each of the two largest political parties 32
represented in the general assembly, acting jointly by political 33
party, shall appoint a member of the commission to serve as a 34
co-chairperson of the commission. 35

(B) (1) Unless otherwise specified in this article, a 36
simple majority of the commission members shall be required for 37
any action by the commission. 38

(2) (a) Except as otherwise provided in division (B) (2) (b) 39
of this section, a majority vote of the members of the 40
commission, including at least one member of the commission who 41
is a member of each of the two largest political parties 42
represented in the general assembly, shall be required to do any 43
of the following: 44

(i) Adopt rules of the commission; 45

(ii) Hire staff for the commission; 46

(iii) Expend funds. 47

(b) If the commission is unable to agree, by the vote 48
required under division (B) (2) (a) of this section, on the manner 49
in which funds should be expended, each co-chairperson of the 50
commission shall have the authority to expend one-half of the 51
funds that have been appropriated to the commission. 52

(3) The affirmative vote of four members of the 53
commission, including at least two members of the commission who 54
represent each of the two largest political parties represented 55
in the general assembly, shall be required to adopt any 56
congressional district plan. For the purpose of this division, a 57
member of the commission shall be considered to represent a 58
political party if the member was appointed to the commission by 59
a member of that political party or if, in the case of the 60
governor, the auditor of state, or the secretary of state, the 61
member is a member of that political party. 62

(C) At the first meeting of the commission, which the 63
governor shall convene only in a year ending in the numeral one, 64
except as provided in Sections 6 and 7 of this article, the 65
commission shall set a schedule for the adoption of procedural 66
rules for the operation of the commission. 67

The commission shall release to the public a proposed 68
congressional district plan for the boundaries for the 69
prescribed number of congressional districts as apportioned to 70
the state pursuant to Section 2 of Article I of the Constitution 71
of the United States. The commission shall draft the proposed 72
plan in the manner prescribed in this article. Before adopting, 73

but after introducing, a proposed plan, the commission shall 74
conduct a minimum of three public hearings across the state to 75
present the proposed plan and shall seek public input regarding 76
the proposed plan. All meetings of the commission shall be open 77
to the public. Meetings shall be broadcast by electronic means 78
of transmission using a medium readily accessible by the general 79
public. 80

The commission shall adopt a final congressional district 81
plan not later than the first day of September of a year ending 82
in the numeral one. After the commission adopts a final plan, 83
the commission shall promptly file the plan with the secretary 84
of state. Upon filing with the secretary of state, the plan 85
shall become effective. 86

Four weeks after the adoption of a congressional district 87
plan, the commission shall be automatically dissolved. 88

(D) The general assembly shall be responsible for making 89
the appropriations it determines necessary in order for the 90
commission to perform its duties under this article. 91

Section 2. Each congressional district shall be entitled 92
to a single representative in the United States house of 93
representatives in each congress. 94

Section 3. (A) The whole population of the state, as 95
determined by the federal decennial census or, if such is 96
unavailable, such other basis as the general assembly may 97
direct, shall be divided by the number of congressional 98
districts apportioned to the state pursuant to Section 2 of 99
Article I of the Constitution of the United States, and the 100
quotient shall be the congressional ratio of representation for 101
ten years next succeeding such redistricting. 102

(B) A congressional district plan shall comply with all of 103
the requirements of division (B) of this section. 104

(1) The population of each congressional district shall be 105
as equal to the congressional ratio of representation as 106
practicable. 107

(2) Any congressional district plan adopted by the 108
commission shall comply with all applicable provisions of the 109
constitutions of Ohio and the United States and of federal law. 110

(3) Every congressional district shall be composed of 111
contiguous territory, and the boundary of each district shall be 112
a single nonintersecting continuous line. 113

(C) Congressional districts shall be created and numbered 114
in the following order of priority, to the extent that such 115
order is consistent with the foregoing standards: 116

(1) Proceeding in succession from the largest to the 117
smallest, each county containing population greater than one 118
congressional ratio of representation shall be divided into as 119
many congressional districts as it has whole ratios of 120
representation. Any fraction of the population in excess of a 121
whole ratio shall be a part of only one adjoining congressional 122
district. 123

(2) Each county containing population equal to the 124
congressional ratio of representation shall be designated a 125
congressional district. 126

(3) The remaining territory of the state shall be divided 127
into congressional districts by combining the areas of counties, 128
municipal corporations, and townships. Where feasible, no county 129
shall be split more than once. 130

(D) (1) A county, municipal corporation, or township is 131
considered to be split if any contiguous portion of its 132
territory is not contained entirely within one district. 133

(2) Where the requirements of divisions (B) and (C) of 134
this section cannot feasibly be attained by forming a 135
congressional district from whole municipal corporations and 136
townships, the district shall be formed by splitting not more 137
than one municipal corporation or township. If the commission 138
must choose between multiple municipal corporations or townships 139
for the purpose of splitting a municipal corporation or township 140
under this division, the municipal corporation or township with 141
the smallest population shall be split. 142

(E) (1) If it is not possible for the commission to comply 143
with all of the requirements of divisions (B), (C), and (D) of 144
this section in drawing a particular congressional district, the 145
commission shall take the first action listed below that makes 146
it possible for the commission to draw that district: 147

(a) Notwithstanding division (D) (2) of this section, the 148
commission shall create the district by splitting two municipal 149
corporations or townships. If the commission must choose between 150
more than two municipal corporations or townships for the 151
purpose of splitting municipal corporations and townships under 152
this division, the municipal corporations or townships shall be 153
split in order of population, proceeding from the smallest to 154
the largest. 155

(b) Notwithstanding division (C) (2) of this section, the 156
commission shall create the district by splitting, once, a 157
single county that contains a population equal to the 158
congressional ratio of representation. 159

(c) Notwithstanding division (C) (1) of this section, the 160

commission shall create the district by including in two 161
districts portions of the territory that remain after a county 162
that contains a population of more than one congressional ratio 163
of representation has been divided into as many congressional 164
districts as it has whole ratios of representation. 165

(2) If the commission takes an action under division (E) 166
(1) of this section, the commission shall include in the 167
congressional district plan a statement explaining which action 168
the commission took under that division and the reason the 169
commission took that action. 170

(3) If the commission complies with divisions (E)(1) and 171
(2) of this section in drawing a district, the commission shall 172
not be considered to have violated division (C)(1), (C)(2), or 173
(D)(2) of this section, as applicable, in drawing that district, 174
for the purpose of an analysis under division (D) of Section 7 175
of this article. 176

Section 4. The Ohio redistricting commission shall attempt 177
to draw a congressional district plan that meets all of the 178
following standards: 179

(A) No congressional district plan shall be drawn 180
primarily to favor or disfavor a political party. 181

(B) The statewide proportion of districts whose voters, 182
based on statewide state and federal partisan general election 183
results during the last ten years, favor each political party 184
shall correspond closely to the statewide preferences of the 185
voters of Ohio. 186

(C) Congressional districts shall be compact. 187

Nothing in this section permits the commission to violate 188
the district standards described in Section 2, 3, or 5 of this 189

article.

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Section 5. Notwithstanding the fact that boundaries of
counties, municipal corporations, and townships within a
district may be changed, district boundaries shall be created by
using the boundaries of counties, municipal corporations, and
townships as they exist at the time of the federal decennial
census on which the redistricting is based, or, if unavailable,
on such other basis as the general assembly has directed.

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Section 6. (A) (1) If the Ohio redistricting commission
fails to adopt a final congressional district plan not later
than the first day of September of a year ending in the numeral
one, in accordance with Section 1 of this article, the
commission shall introduce a proposed congressional district
plan by a simple majority vote of the commission.

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(2) After introducing a proposed congressional district
plan under division (A) (1) of this section, the commission shall
hold a public hearing concerning the proposed plan, at which the
public may offer testimony and at which the commission may adopt
amendments to the proposed plan. Members of the commission
should attend the hearing; however, only a quorum of the members
of the commission is required to conduct the hearing.

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(3) After the hearing described in division (A) (2) of this
section is held, and not later than the fifteenth day of
September of a year ending in the numeral one, the commission
shall adopt a final congressional district plan, either by the
vote required to adopt a plan under division (B) (3) of Section 1
of this article or by a simple majority vote of the commission.

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(B) If the commission adopts a final congressional
district plan in accordance with division (A) (3) of this section
by the vote required to adopt a plan under division (B) (3) of

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Section 1 of this article, the plan shall take effect upon 220
filing with the secretary of state and shall remain effective 221
until the next year ending in the numeral one, except as 222
provided in Section 7 of this article. 223

(C) (1) (a) Except as otherwise provided in division (C) (1) 224
(b) of this section, if the commission adopts a final 225
congressional district plan in accordance with division (A) (3) 226
of this section by a simple majority vote of the commission, and 227
not by the vote required to adopt a plan under division (B) (3) 228
of Section 1 of this article, the plan shall take effect upon 229
filing with the secretary of state and shall remain effective 230
until two general elections for the United States house of 231
representatives have occurred under the plan. 232

(b) If the commission adopts a final congressional 233
district plan in accordance with division (A) (3) of this section 234
by a simple majority vote of the commission, and not by the vote 235
required to adopt a plan under division (B) of Section 1 of this 236
article, and that plan is adopted to replace a plan that ceased 237
to be effective under division (C) (1) (a) of this section before 238
a year ending in the numeral one, the plan adopted under this 239
division shall take effect upon filing with the secretary of 240
state and shall remain effective until a year ending in the 241
numeral one, except as provided in Section 7 of this article. 242

(2) A final congressional district plan adopted under 243
division (C) (1) (a) or (b) of this section shall include a 244
statement explaining what the commission determined to be the 245
statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio and the manner in 246
which the statewide proportion of districts in the plan whose 247
voters, based on statewide state and federal partisan general 248
election results during the last ten years, favor each political 249
party corresponds closely to those preferences, as described in 250

division (B) of Section 4 of this article. At the time the plan 251
is adopted, a member of the commission who does not vote in 252
favor of the plan may submit a declaration of the member's 253
opinion concerning the statement included with the plan. 254

(D) After a congressional district plan adopted under 255
division (C) (1) (a) of this section ceases to be effective, and 256
not earlier than the first day of July of the year following the 257
year in which the plan ceased to be effective, the commission 258
shall be reconstituted as provided in Section 1 of this article, 259
convene, and adopt a new congressional district plan in 260
accordance with this article, to be used until the next time for 261
redistricting under this article. The commission shall draw the 262
new congressional district plan using the same population and 263
county, municipal corporation, and township boundary data as 264
were used to draw the previous plan adopted under division (C) 265
of this section. 266

Section 7. (A) The supreme court of Ohio shall have 267
exclusive, original jurisdiction in all cases arising under this 268
article. 269

(B) In the event that any section of this constitution 270
relating to redistricting, any congressional district plan made 271
by the Ohio redistricting commission, or any district is 272
determined to be invalid by an unappealed final order of a court 273
of competent jurisdiction then, notwithstanding any other 274
provisions of this constitution, the commission shall be 275
reconstituted as provided in Section 1 of this article, convene, 276
and ascertain and determine a congressional district plan in 277
conformity with such provisions of this constitution as are then 278
valid, to be used until the next time for redistricting under 279
this article in conformity with such provisions of this 280
constitution as are then valid. 281

(C) (1) No court shall order, in any circumstance, the 282
implementation or enforcement of any congressional district plan 283
that has not been approved by the commission in the manner 284
prescribed by this article. 285

(2) No court shall order the commission to adopt a 286
particular congressional district plan or to draw a particular 287
district. 288

(3) If the supreme court of Ohio determines that a 289
congressional district plan adopted by the commission does not 290
comply with the requirements of Section 2, 3, or 5 of this 291
article, the available remedies shall be as follows: 292

(a) If the court finds that the plan contains one or more 293
isolated violations of those requirements, the court shall order 294
the commission to amend the plan to correct the violation. 295

(b) If, in considering a plan adopted under division (C) 296
of Section 6 of this article, the court determines that both of 297
the following are true, the court shall order the commission to 298
adopt a new congressional district plan in accordance with this 299
article: 300

(i) The plan significantly violates those requirements in 301
a manner that materially affects the ability of the plan to 302
contain districts whose voters favor political parties in an 303
overall proportion that corresponds closely to the statewide 304
political party preferences of the voters of Ohio, as described 305
in division (B) of Section 4 of this article. 306

(ii) The statewide proportion of districts in the plan 307
whose voters, based on statewide state and federal partisan 308
general election results during the last ten years, favor each 309
political party does not correspond closely to the statewide 310

preferences of the voters of Ohio.

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Section 8. If a court of competent jurisdiction issues an
unappealed final order that the general assembly must be
responsible for the redistricting of this state for congress,
all of the following shall apply:

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(A) The general assembly shall adopt a final congressional
district plan not later than the first day of September of a
year ending in the numeral one.

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(B) The congressional district plan shall comply with the
requirements of Sections 2, 3, and 5 of this article.

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(C) The general assembly shall attempt to comply with the
standards described in Section 4 of this article in drawing the
congressional district plan.

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(D) Section 7 of this article shall apply to a
congressional district plan adopted by the general assembly.

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Section 9. The various provisions of this article are
intended to be severable, and the invalidity of one or more of
such provisions shall not affect the validity of the remaining
provisions.

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EFFECTIVE DATE

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If adopted by a majority of the electors voting on this
proposal, Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of Article XIX
of the Constitution of the State of Ohio enacted by this
proposal take effect January 1, 2021.

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OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL MODERNIZATION COMMISSION

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMITTEE

OHIO CONSTITUTION ARTICLE II, SECTION 2

ELECTION AND TERM OF STATE LEGISLATORS [OPTION ONE]

The Legislative Branch and Executive Branch Committee of the Ohio Constitutional Modernization Commission issues this report and recommendation regarding Article II, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution concerning the election and term of state legislators. It is issued pursuant to Rule 8.2 of the Ohio Constitutional Modernization Commission's Rules of Procedure and Conduct.

Recommendation

The committee recommends that Article II, Section 2 be amended to add one term to the current limit imposed on state senators, and two terms to the current limit imposed on state representatives. The committee further recommends that Article II, Section 2 be amended to allow legislators holding office at the time of the effective date of the amendment to continue to serve up to a total of 12 consecutive years.

Background

Article II, Section 2, reads as follows:

Representatives shall be elected biennially by the electors of the respective house of representatives districts; their term of office shall commence on the first day of January next thereafter and continue two years.

Senators shall be elected by the electors of the respective senate districts; their terms of office shall commence on the first day of January next after their election. All terms of senators which commence on the first day of January, 1969 shall be four years, and all terms which commence on the first day of January, 1971 shall be four years. Thereafter, except for the filling of vacancies for

unexpired terms, senators shall be elected to and hold office for terms of four years.

No person shall hold the office of State Senator for a period of longer than two successive terms of four years. No person shall hold the office of State Representative for a period longer than four successive terms of two years. Terms shall be considered successive unless separated by a period of four or more years. Only terms beginning on or after January 1, 1993 shall be considered in determining an individual's eligibility to hold office.

In determining the eligibility of an individual to hold office in accordance [with] to this article, (A) time spent in an office in fulfillment of a term to which another person was first elected shall not be considered provided that a period of at least four years passed between the time, if any, [in] which the individual previously held that office, and the time the individual is elected or appointed to fulfill the unexpired term; and (B) a person who is elected to an office in a regularly scheduled general election and resigns prior to the completion of the term for which he or she was elected, shall be considered to have served the full term in that office.

Article II concerns the Legislative Branch, providing the organizational structure and membership requirements of the General Assembly, the governor's veto power, and the procedures for initiative and referendum.

Amendments, Proposed Amendments, and Other Review

The 1802 Constitution provided for terms of only one year for representatives and two years for senators.¹ The 1851 Constitution increased the terms to two years for each. Term lengths of two years for senators remained in place until 1956, when voters approved, by a vote of 57.4 percent to 42.6 percent, an amendment that increased the term of office to four years.² Another amendment in 1967 staggered senate terms, requiring only half of the senate to stand for election at a time.³

In the early 1990s, some 21 states enacted state legislative term limits, responding to public opinion that "career politicians" were to blame for perceived governmental deficiencies.⁴ In line with that trend, Ohio voters adopted an amendment limiting all state legislators to eight consecutive years of service, with the result that senators may only serve two successive terms of four years, and representatives may only serve four successive terms of two years.⁵ Placed on the ballot by initiative petition as Issue 3, the measure was approved on November 3, 1992 by a margin of 2,982,285 to 1,378,009, or 68.4 percent to 31.6 percent.⁶

In the 1970s, the Ohio Constitutional Revision Commission did not review this provision.

Litigation Involving the Provision

Article II, Section 2 has not been the subject of litigation; however, similar state constitutional provisions by which Ohio and other states imposed term limits upon federal congressional offices were rejected in *U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton*, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (“Allowing individual States to adopt their own qualifications for congressional service would be inconsistent with the Framers' vision of a uniform National Legislature representing the people of the United States.”).

Presentations and Resources Considered

The committee received two presentations from John C. Green, Ph.D., Director of the Bliss Institute of Applied Politics at the University of Akron, and one presentation from Ann Henkener, First Vice President of the League of Women Voters of Ohio on this issue.

First Green Presentation

John C. Green first presented to the committee on April 10, 2014. According to Dr. Green, Ohio’s model, called the “common model,” imposes eight-year consecutive limits in each chamber, while other models include six- or eight-year consecutive limits for the house and senate respectively, twelve-year lifetime limitations in both chambers combined, and twelve-year consecutive limits in each chamber. Dr. Green indicated that, between 1997 and 2012, six states repealed or struck down term limits, while one state enacted term limits. Thus, in 2014, 15 states had legislative term limits.

Describing the impact of legislative term limits, Dr. Green stated that term limits have impeded the development of legislative leaders, reducing leaders’ agenda-setting and coalition-building capabilities. He further indicated that the limits reduce the influence of the legislative branch in state government, instead empowering the executive branch, administrative agencies, nonpartisan staff, and lobbyists. Dr. Green also indicated that term limits increase partisanship and reduce the time legislators have to accomplish legislative goals. He noted that term limits have failed to achieve the goal of increasing the number of “citizen legislators,” as opposed to career legislators. Dr. Green observed that term limits have not increased gender, racial, or ethnic diversity in state legislatures.

Dr. Green stated that term limits have had only a modest impact on the electoral process, with no increase in the overall competitiveness of elections, no decrease in campaign spending, and an increase in the role of party caucuses in legislative campaigns. Dr. Green opined that, despite these drawbacks, term limits will continue to have strong public support. However, he stated that increasing the limits from 8 years to 12 years may alleviate the problem of a diminished role for legislative leadership. He also indicated that allowing former legislators to return to office mitigates some of the impact of term limits.

Second Green Presentation

In his second presentation to the committee, on June 12, 2014, Dr. Green presented polling data related to term limits. Conducted by the Center for Marketing and Opinion Research for the Bliss Institute in April 2014, the “2014 Akron Buckeye Poll” surveyed a random sample of 1,078 registered Ohio voters, including both landline and cell phone users. Participants were asked whether they thought term limits produced poor government or good government and whether the limits have helped or hurt the state. The resulting data, with a margin of error of plus or minus three percentage points, indicates that 57 percent of those polled indicated they thought that term limits have helped the state, with 30 percent stating that the limits hurt the state and 13 percent having no opinion. These figures may be compared with 2005 polling data indicating that 59 percent of voters believed that term limits help the state, with 30 percent saying the limits hurt the state and 11 percent indicating they had no opinion.

Asked whether term limits should be kept at eight years, extended to 12 years, or repealed altogether, 70 percent of those polled favored keeping term limits at eight years, with 13 percent willing to extend the limits to 12 years, 12 percent agreeing that they should be repealed altogether, and five percent having no opinion. Queried as to whether they could accept an increase in the limit to 12 years, 38 percent of participants answered that they were firm on keeping the total number of years served at eight, with 32 percent willing to accept a 12-year limit, 13 percent being firm on a 12-year limit, 12 percent supporting a complete repeal of term limits, and five percent having no opinion.

Asked whether they would support increasing state legislative terms by two years, meaning that representatives would serve a four-year term and senators a six-year term, 61 percent of participants indicated they would support such a measure, with 36 percent indicating they would not and three percent having no opinion.

Sixty-two percent of participants stated that it should take a legislator less than five years to learn the job, while 28 percent said five-to-ten years was appropriate, seven percent identifying more than 10 years as the correct time span, and three percent having no opinion.

Henkener Presentation

Ann Henkener, First Vice President of the League of Women Voters of Ohio (“League”), presented to the committee on July 10, 2014. According to Ms. Henkener, the League’s long opposition to term limits is based upon the rationale that terms are inherently limited to two years for representatives and four years for senators, requiring legislators to seek re-election at the end of those terms. Ms. Henkener asserted that the arguments against term limits as presented by the League to voters in 1992, when the current version of Article II, Section 2 appeared on the ballot, have proved mostly true. As she described them, those arguments are that term limits create more “lame duck” legislators, reduce competition for legislative seats, result in less-experienced legislators, reduce institutional memory, impede long-term thinking about societal problems, and increase the power of staff, bureaucrats, and lobbyists. Ms. Henkener opined that voters continue to support the concept of term limits because they are perceived as a counterbalance to

problems attributed to the redistricting process. She stated that if redistricting reform occurs, allowing for more competitive districts, then voters might look more favorably on extending term limits.

Conclusion

The Legislative Branch and Executive Branch Committee concludes that Article II, Section 2 should be amended to expand term limits for state senators by one term, and for state representatives by two terms. The committee also concludes that these extensions should apply to legislators who are in office at the time of the effective date of an amendment, with the result that senators serving their first term would be eligible to hold office for two more four-year terms, while senators in their second term would be eligible for one additional four-year term. Likewise, representatives in their first term may hold office for five more two-year terms, those in their second term would be permitted four more two-year terms, and so on. The modified provision additionally would allow newly-elected legislators to be eligible to serve twelve consecutive years in their respective houses.

The committee also recommends that Article II, Section 2 be reorganized to first describe the length of term and term limits for state senators, followed by a description of the length of term and term limits for state representatives. This reorganization does not substantially change the meaning of the provision but is intended to assist the reader's comprehension of the meaning of the section. These proposed changes bring the format of the section in line with the structure of other sections in Article II.

Thus, the committee recommends Section 2 be amended as shown in Attachment A, which provides a marked-up version of the provision. Attachment B provides a clean version of Section 2, if the proposed amendment is adopted.

Date Adopted

After formal consideration by the Legislative Branch and Executive Branch Committee on March 12, 2015, and April 9, 2015, the committee voted to adopt this report and recommendation on _____.

Endnotes

¹ Steven H. Steinglass & Gino J. Scarselli, *The Ohio State Constitution* (2nd prtg. 2011), p. 140.

² Michael F. Curtin, *Ohio Politics Almanac* (Kent: Kent State UP, 2d Ed., 2006), p. 83.

³ Steinglass & Scarselli, *supra*.

⁴ Steven F. Huefner, *Term Limits in State Legislative Elections: Less Value for More Money?*, 79 Ind. L.J. 427, 428 (2004).

⁵ Steinglass & Scarselli, *supra*, p. 141.

⁶ *Id.*, Appendix B.

Option One - Attachment A

Article II, Section 2

~~Representatives shall be elected biennially by the electors of the respective House of Representative districts; their term of office shall commence on the first day of January next thereafter and continue two years.~~

Senators shall be elected by the electors of the respective Senate districts; ~~their~~ The term of office of a senator shall commence on the first day of January ~~next after their~~ following the election. All terms of senators which commence on the first day of January, 1969 shall be four years, and all terms which commence on the first day of January, 1971 shall be four years. Thereafter, except for the filling of vacancies for unexpired terms, senators shall be elected to and hold office for terms of four years. No person shall hold the office of senator for a period longer than three successive terms of four years. Terms shall be considered successive unless separated by a period of four or more years.

Representatives shall be elected biennially by the electors of the respective House of Representative districts. The term of office of a representative shall commence on the first day of January following the election and continue two years. No person shall hold the office of representative for a period longer than six successive terms of two years. Terms shall be considered successive unless separated by a period of four or more years.

~~No person shall hold the office of State Senator for a period of longer than two successive terms of four years. No person shall hold the office of State Representative for a period longer than four six successive terms of two years. Terms shall be considered successive unless separated by a period of four or more years. Only terms beginning on or after January 1, 1993 shall be considered in determining an individual's eligibility to hold office.~~

In determining the eligibility of an individual to hold office in accordance ~~to~~ with this article, (A) time spent in an office in fulfillment of a term to which another person was first elected shall not be considered provided that a period of at least four years passed between the time, if any, in which the individual previously held that office, and the time the individual is elected or appointed to fulfill the unexpired term; and (B) a person who is elected to an office in a regularly scheduled general election and resigns prior to the completion of the term for which he or she was elected, shall be considered to have served the full term in that office.

Option One - Attachment B*Article II, Section 2*

Senators shall be elected by the electors of the respective Senate districts. The term of office of a senator shall commence on the first day of January following the election. All terms of senators which commence on the first day of January 1969 shall be four years, and all terms which commence on the first day of January 1971 shall be four years. Thereafter, except for the filling of vacancies for unexpired terms, senators shall be elected to and hold office for terms of four years. No person shall hold the office of senator for a period longer than three successive terms of four years. Terms shall be considered successive unless separated by a period of four or more years.

Representatives shall be elected biennially by the electors of the respective House of Representatives districts. The term of office of a representative shall commence on the first day of January following the election and continue two years. No person shall hold the office of representative for a period longer than six successive terms of two years. Terms shall be considered successive unless separated by a period of four or more years.

In determining the eligibility of an individual to hold office in accordance with this article, (A) time spent in an office in fulfillment of a term to which another person was first elected shall not be considered provided that a period of at least four years passed between the time, if any, in which the individual previously held that office, and the time the individual is elected or appointed to fulfill the unexpired term; and (B) a person who is elected to an office in a regularly scheduled general election and resigns prior to the completion of the term for which he or she was elected, shall be considered to have served the full term in that office.



OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL MODERNIZATION COMMISSION

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMITTEE

OHIO CONSTITUTION ARTICLE II, SECTION 2

ELECTION AND TERM OF STATE LEGISLATORS [OPTION TWO]

The Legislative Branch and Executive Branch Committee of the Ohio Constitutional Modernization Commission issues this report and recommendation regarding Article II, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution concerning the election and term of state legislators. It is issued pursuant to Rule 8.2 of the Ohio Constitutional Modernization Commission's Rules of Procedure and Conduct.

Recommendation

The committee recommends that Article II, Section 2 be amended to allow all newly-elected state legislators to serve a total of twelve consecutive years, consisting of three four-year terms for senators and six two-year terms for representatives. The committee also recommends that this expansion of the current eight-year limit on consecutive terms of legislative service not apply to current members of the General Assembly, with the result that all members already in office at the time of the effective date of the amendment would be limited to eight years consecutive service.

Background

Article II, Section 2, reads as follows:

Representatives shall be elected biennially by the electors of the respective house of representatives districts; their term of office shall commence on the first day of January next thereafter and continue two years.

Senators shall be elected by the electors of the respective senate districts; their terms of office shall commence on the first day of January next after their election. All terms of senators which commence on the first day of January, 1969 shall be four years, and all terms which commence on the first day of January,

1971 shall be four years. Thereafter, except for the filling of vacancies for unexpired terms, senators shall be elected to and hold office for terms of four years.

No person shall hold the office of State Senator for a period of longer than two successive terms of four years. No person shall hold the office of State Representative for a period longer than four successive terms of two years. Terms shall be considered successive unless separated by a period of four or more years. Only terms beginning on or after January 1, 1993 shall be considered in determining an individual's eligibility to hold office.

In determining the eligibility of an individual to hold office in accordance [with] to this article, (A) time spent in an office in fulfillment of a term to which another person was first elected shall not be considered provided that a period of at least four years passed between the time, if any, [in] which the individual previously held that office, and the time the individual is elected or appointed to fulfill the unexpired term; and (B) a person who is elected to an office in a regularly scheduled general election and resigns prior to the completion of the term for which he or she was elected, shall be considered to have served the full term in that office.

Article II concerns the Legislative Branch, providing the organizational structure and membership requirements of the General Assembly, the governor's veto power, and the procedures for initiative and referendum.

Amendments, Proposed Amendments, and Other Review

The 1802 Constitution provided for terms of only one year for representatives and two years for senators.¹ The 1851 Constitution increased the terms to two years for each. Term lengths of two years for senators remained in place until 1956, when voters approved, by a vote of 57.4 percent to 42.6 percent, an amendment that increased the term of office to four years.² Another amendment in 1967 staggered senate terms, requiring only half of the senate to stand for election at a time.³

In the early 1990s, some 21 states enacted state legislative term limits, responding to public opinion that "career politicians" were to blame for perceived governmental deficiencies.⁴ In line with that trend, Ohio voters adopted an amendment limiting all state legislators to eight consecutive years of service, with the result that senators may only serve two successive terms of four years, and representatives may only serve four successive terms of two years.⁵ Placed on the ballot by initiative petition as Issue 3, the measure was approved on November 3, 1992 by a margin of 2,982,285 to 1,378,009, or 68.4 percent to 31.6 percent.⁶

In the 1970s, the Ohio Constitutional Revision Commission did not review this provision.

Litigation Involving the Provision

Article II, Section 2 has not been the subject of litigation; however, similar state constitutional provisions by which Ohio and other states imposed term limits upon federal congressional offices were rejected in *U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton*, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (“Allowing individual States to adopt their own qualifications for congressional service would be inconsistent with the Framers' vision of a uniform National Legislature representing the people of the United States.”).

Presentations and Resources Considered

The committee received two presentations from John C. Green, Ph.D., Director of the Bliss Institute of Applied Politics at the University of Akron, and one presentation from Ann Henkener, First Vice President of the League of Women Voters of Ohio on this issue.

First Green Presentation

John C. Green first presented to the committee on April 10, 2014. According to Dr. Green, Ohio’s model, called the “common model,” imposes eight-year consecutive limits in each chamber, while other models include six- or eight-year consecutive limits for the house and senate respectively, twelve-year lifetime limitations in both chambers combined, and twelve-year consecutive limits in each chamber. Dr. Green indicated that, between 1997 and 2012, six states repealed or struck down term limits, while one state enacted term limits. Thus, in 2014, 15 states had legislative term limits.

Describing the impact of legislative term limits, Dr. Green stated that term limits have impeded the development of legislative leaders, reducing leaders’ agenda-setting and coalition-building capabilities. He further indicated that the limits reduce the influence of the legislative branch in state government, instead empowering the executive branch, administrative agencies, nonpartisan staff, and lobbyists. Dr. Green also indicated that term limits increase partisanship and reduce the time legislators have to accomplish legislative goals. He noted that term limits have failed to achieve the goal of increasing the number of “citizen legislators,” as opposed to career legislators. Dr. Green observed that term limits have not increased gender, racial, or ethnic diversity in state legislatures.

Dr. Green stated that term limits have had only a modest impact on the electoral process, with no increase in the overall competitiveness of elections, no decrease in campaign spending, and an increase in the role of party caucuses in legislative campaigns. Dr. Green opined that, despite these drawbacks, term limits will continue to have strong public support. However, he stated that increasing the limits from 8 years to 12 years may alleviate the problem of a diminished role for legislative leadership. He also indicated that allowing former legislators to return to office mitigates some of the impact of term limits.

Second Green Presentation

In his second presentation to the committee, on June 12, 2014, Dr. Green presented polling data related to term limits. Conducted by the Center for Marketing and Opinion Research for the Bliss Institute in April 2014, the “2014 Akron Buckeye Poll” surveyed a random sample of 1,078 registered Ohio voters, including both landline and cell phone users. Participants were asked whether they thought term limits produced poor government or good government and whether the limits have helped or hurt the state. The resulting data, with a margin of error of plus or minus three percentage points, indicates that 57 percent of those polled indicated they thought that term limits have helped the state, with 30 percent stating that the limits hurt the state and 13 percent having no opinion. These figures may be compared with 2005 polling data indicating that 59 percent of voters believed that term limits help the state, with 30 percent saying the limits hurt the state and 11 percent indicating they had no opinion.

Asked whether term limits should be kept at eight years, extended to 12 years, or repealed altogether, 70 percent of those polled favored keeping term limits at eight years, with 13 percent willing to extend the limits to 12 years, 12 percent agreeing that they should be repealed altogether, and five percent having no opinion. Queried as to whether they could accept an increase in the limit to 12 years, 38 percent of participants answered that they were firm on keeping the total number of years served at eight, with 32 percent willing to accept a 12-year limit, 13 percent being firm on a 12-year limit, 12 percent supporting a complete repeal of term limits, and five percent having no opinion.

Asked whether they would support increasing state legislative terms by two years, meaning that representatives would serve a four-year term and senators a six-year term, 61 percent of participants indicated they would support such a measure, with 36 percent indicating they would not and three percent having no opinion.

Sixty-two percent of participants stated that it should take a legislator less than five years to learn the job, while 28 percent said five-to-ten years was appropriate, seven percent identifying more than 10 years as the correct time span, and three percent having no opinion.

Henkener Presentation

Ann Henkener, First Vice President of the League of Women Voters of Ohio (“League”), presented to the committee on July 10, 2014. According to Ms. Henkener, the League’s long opposition to term limits is based upon the rationale that terms are inherently limited to two years for representatives and four years for senators, requiring legislators to seek re-election at the end of those terms. Ms. Henkener asserted that the arguments against term limits as presented by the League to voters in 1992, when the current version of Article II, Section 2 appeared on the ballot, have proved mostly true. As she described them, those arguments are that term limits create more “lame duck” legislators, reduce competition for legislative seats, result in less-experienced legislators, reduce institutional memory, impede long-term thinking about societal problems, and increase the power of staff, bureaucrats, and lobbyists. Ms. Henkener opined that voters

continue to support the concept of term limits because they are perceived as a counterbalance to problems attributed to the redistricting process. She stated that if redistricting reform occurs, allowing for more competitive districts, then voters might look more favorably on extending term limits.

Conclusion

The Legislative Branch and Executive Branch Committee concludes that Article II, Section 2 should be amended to expand term limits for newly-elected state senators by one term, and for state representatives by two terms. The committee does not recommend extending term limits for current members of the General Assembly, who would be limited to eight consecutive years of service in their respective houses.

The committee also recommends that Article II, Section 2 be reorganized to first describe the length of term and term limits for state senators, followed by a description of the length of term and term limits for state representatives. This reorganization is intended to assist the reader's comprehension of the meaning of the section. The committee further recommends that the provision be reorganized to include a supplemental paragraph entitled "Effective Date and Repeal," consisting of a description of when the provision, if adopted, would take effect. The committee also recommends the inclusion of "Schedule 1," consisting of an explanation that the extended term limits contained in the revised provision will only apply to newly appointed or elected legislators. These proposed changes bring the format of the section in line with the structure of other sections in Article II.

Therefore, the committee recommends Section 2 be amended as shown in Attachment A, which provides a marked-up version of the provision. Attachment B provides a clean version of Section 2, if the proposed amendment is adopted.

Date Adopted

After formal consideration by the Legislative Branch and Executive Branch Committee on March 12, 2015, and April 9, 2015, the committee voted to adopt this report and recommendation on _____.

Endnotes

¹ Steven H. Steinglass & Gino J. Scarselli, *The Ohio State Constitution* (2nd prtg. 2011), p. 140.

² Michael F. Curtin, *Ohio Politics Almanac* (Kent: Kent State UP, 2d Ed., 2006), p. 83.

³ Steinglass & Scarselli, *supra*.

⁴ Steven F. Huefner, *Term Limits in State Legislative Elections: Less Value for More Money?*, 79 Ind. L.J. 427, 428 (2004).

⁵ Steinglass & Scarselli, *supra*, p. 141.

⁶ *Id.*, Appendix B.

Option Two - Attachment A

Article II, Section 2

~~Representatives shall be elected biennially by the electors of the respective House of Representatives districts; their term of office shall commence on the first day of January next thereafter and continue two years.~~

Senators shall be elected by the electors of the respective Senate districts; ~~their~~ Their ~~terms~~ term of office of a senator shall commence on the first day of January ~~next after~~ following the election. All terms of senators which commence on the first day of January, 1969 shall be four years, and all terms which commence on the first day of January, 1971 shall be four years. Thereafter, except for the filling of vacancies for unexpired terms, senators shall be elected to and hold office for terms of four years. No person shall hold the office of senator for a period longer than three successive terms of four years. Terms shall be considered successive unless separated by a period of four or more years.

Representatives shall be elected biennially by the electors of the respective House of Representative districts. The term of office of a representative shall commence on the first day of January following the election and continue two years. No person shall hold the office of representative for a period longer than six successive terms of two years. Terms shall be considered successive unless separated by a period of four or more years.

~~No person shall hold the office of State Senator for a period of longer than two successive terms of four years. No person shall hold the office of State Representative for a period longer than four successive terms of two years. Terms shall be considered successive unless separated by a period of four or more years. Only terms beginning on or after January 1, 1993 shall be considered in determining an individual's eligibility to hold office.~~

In determining the eligibility of an individual to hold office in accordance with this article, (A) time spent in an office in fulfillment of a term to which another person was first elected shall not be considered provided that a period of at least four years passed between the time, if any, in which the individual previously held that office, and the time the individual is elected or appointed to fulfill the unexpired term; and (B) a person who is elected to an office in a regularly scheduled general election and resigns prior to the completion of the term for which he or she was elected, shall be considered to have served the full term in that office.

Option Two - Attachment B

Article II, Section 2

Senators shall be elected by the electors of the respective Senate districts. The term of office of a senator shall commence on the first day of January following the election. All terms of senators which commence on the first day of January 1969 shall be four years, and all terms which commence on the first day of January 1971 shall be four years. Thereafter, except for the filling of vacancies for unexpired terms, senators shall be elected to and hold office for terms of four years. No person shall hold the office of senator for a period longer than three successive terms of four years. Terms shall be considered successive unless separated by a period of four or more years.

Representatives shall be elected biennially by the electors of the respective House of Representatives districts. The term of office of a representative shall commence on the first day of January following the election and continue two years. No person shall hold the office of representative for a period longer than six successive terms of two years. Terms shall be considered successive unless separated by a period of four or more years.

In determining the eligibility of an individual to hold office in accordance with this article, (A) time spent in an office in fulfillment of a term to which another person was first elected shall not be considered provided that a period of at least four years passed between the time, if any, in which the individual previously held that office, and the time the individual is elected or appointed to fulfill the unexpired term; and (B) a person who is elected to an office in a regularly scheduled general election and resigns prior to the completion of the term for which he or she was elected, shall be considered to have served the full term in that office.

EFFECTIVE DATE AND REPEAL

If adopted by a majority of the electors voting on this proposal, Section 2 of Article II as amended by this proposal shall take effect on January 1, 2016, and existing Section 2 of Article II shall be repealed effective January 1, 2016.

SCHEDULE 1

The version of Section 2 of Article II in effect on December 31, 2015 shall apply to senators and representatives who are in office on that date.

The version of Section 2 of Article II as amended by this proposal shall first apply to senators and representatives who are appointed or elected after the effective date of this amendment and who are not in office on December 31, 2015.

As Introduced

**131st General Assembly
Regular Session
2015-2016**

S. J. R. No. 1

Senator Faber

**Cosponsors: Senators Widener, Patton, Oelslager, Obhof, Williams, Seitz,
LaRose, Bacon, Beagle, Hottinger**

JOINT RESOLUTION

Proposing to amend Sections 4, 20, and 31 of Article II,
Section 19 of Article III, and Section 6 of Article IV
and to enact Section 20a of Article II of the
Constitution of the State of Ohio to establish the
Public Office Compensation Commission.

Be it resolved by the General Assembly of the State of
Ohio, three-fifths of the members elected to each house
concurring herein, that there shall be submitted to the electors
of the state, in the manner prescribed by law at the general
election to be held on November 3, 2015, a proposal to amend
Sections 4, 20, and 31 of Article II, Section 19 of Article III,
and Section 6 of Article IV and to enact Section 20a of Article
II of the Constitution of the State of Ohio to read as follows:

ARTICLE II

Section 4. No member of the general assembly shall, during
the term of office for which ~~he~~ the member was elected, unless
during such term ~~he~~ the member resigns therefrom, hold any
public office under the United States, or this state, or a

political subdivision thereof; but this provision does not
extend to officers of a political party, notaries public, or
officers of the militia or of the United States armed forces.

No member of the general assembly shall, during the term
of office for which ~~he the member~~ was elected, or for one year
thereafter, be appointed to any public office under this state,
which office was created ~~or the compensation of which was~~
~~increased,~~ during the term of office for which ~~he the member~~ was
elected.

Section 20. The General Assembly, in cases not provided
for in this constitution, shall fix the term of office of all
officers and the compensation of all nonelected officers; but no
change therein shall affect the salary of any nonelected officer
during ~~his the nonelected officer's~~ existing term of office,
unless the office be abolished.

Section 20a. (A) The Public Office Compensation Commission
is created. The Commission consists of the following nine voting
members: two members appointed by the Governor; two members
appointed by the President of the Senate; two members appointed
by the Speaker of the House of Representatives; one member
appointed by the Minority Leader of the Senate; one member
appointed by the Minority Leader of the House of
Representatives; and one member appointed by the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court. The following are not eligible to be
appointed as a member of the Commission: (1) an officer or
employee of the state or a political subdivision of the state or
a family member, as defined by law, of an officer or employee of
the state or a political subdivision of the state; (2) an
individual who, within twelve months before appointment, was a
candidate for election to a public office in the state; or (3)
an individual who engages during at least a portion of the

individual's time to actively advocate legislation on behalf of
another.

Terms of members of the Commission are for two years.
Members may not serve more than four consecutive terms. The
Commission chairperson shall be selected by majority vote of all
members of the Commission. Members are not entitled to
compensation, but shall be reimbursed for actual and necessary
expenses incurred in the performance of Commission duties. A
vacancy among the members of the Commission shall be filled in
the manner prescribed for the original appointment.

(B) (1) The Public Office Compensation Commission shall
meet each even-numbered year to review the current compensation
of each elected public office in the state. The Commission shall
consider such factors as are provided by law, including the
amount of compensation paid to similarly skilled individuals in
the private sector, the amount of compensation paid to
individuals in comparable elected public offices in other
states, and the current financial condition of and within Ohio.
After completing its review, the Commission, by vote of at least
five of its members, shall prepare a proposed compensation plan
that sets forth the compensation of each elected public office
in the state. The Commission shall prepare a report of its
proposed compensation plan and shall present the proposed
compensation plan and report at not less than three public
hearings in the state in order to obtain public input regarding
the proposed compensation plan. After conducting its public
hearings, the Commission, by vote of at least five of its
members, shall issue a final compensation plan that sets forth
the compensation of each elected public office in the state. The
Commission shall prepare a report of its final compensation plan
not later than the last day of December in each even-numbered

year. 81

If a proposed or final compensation plan increases or 82
decreases the compensation amount of an elected public office by 83
greater than the lesser of the following, the Commission shall 84
include, in its accompanying report, specific factors that 85
support the increase or decrease: 86

(a) Three per cent; or 87

(b) The percentage increase, if any, in the consumer price 88
index, or a generally available comparable index, over the 89
twelve-month period that ends on the thirtieth day of September 90
of the immediately preceding year, rounded to the nearest one- 91
tenth of one per cent. 92

(2) The compensation amounts set forth in the final 93
compensation plan for each elected public office in the state 94
take effect on the first day of July of the following odd- 95
numbered year unless, before that day, the General Assembly, by 96
a three-fifths vote of the members elected to each house, adopts 97
a concurrent resolution rejecting one or more of the 98
compensation amounts. 99

If the General Assembly rejects a final compensation plan 100
or portion thereof, a member of the General Assembly who, at the 101
time the plan was voted on, voted or would have been entitled to 102
vote thereon, is not entitled to an increase in compensation for 103
the duration of the member's term of office. 104

(C) This section does not affect the compensation of a 105
county officer elected under a county charter that has been 106
adopted under Article X, Sections 3 and 4 of this constitution, 107
or the compensation of an officer of a municipal corporation 108
elected under the power of local self-government as exercised by 109

a municipal corporation under Article XVIII, Sections 3 and 7 of 110
this constitution. 111

Section 31. The ~~members and officers of~~ the General 112
Assembly shall receive a fixed compensation, ~~to be prescribed by~~ 113
~~law, and no other allowance or perquisites, either in the~~ 114
~~payment of postage or otherwise; and no change in their~~ 115
~~compensation shall take effect during their term of office.~~as 116
provided for in Article II, Section 20a of this constitution. 117

ARTICLE III 118

Section 19. The officers mentioned in this article shall, 119
at stated times, receive, for their services, ~~a compensation to~~ 120
~~be established by law, which shall neither be increased nor~~ 121
~~diminished during the period for which they shall have been~~ 122
~~elected~~ as provided for in Article II, Section 20a of this 123
constitution. 124

ARTICLE IV 125

Section 6. (A) (1) The chief justice and the justices of 126
the supreme court shall be elected by the electors of the state 127
at large, for terms of not less than six years. 128

(2) The judges of the courts of appeals shall be elected 129
by the electors of their respective appellate districts, for 130
terms of not less than six years. 131

(3) The judges of the courts of common pleas and the 132
divisions thereof shall be elected by the electors of the 133
counties, districts, or, as may be provided by law, other 134
subdivisions, in which their respective courts are located, for 135
terms of not less than six years, and each judge of a court of 136
common pleas or division thereof shall reside during ~~his~~the 137

judge's term of office in the county, district, or subdivision 138
in which ~~his~~ the judge's court is located. 139

(4) Terms of office of all judges shall begin on the days 140
fixed by law, and laws shall be enacted to prescribe the times 141
and mode of their election. 142

(B) The judges of the supreme court, courts of appeals, 143
courts of common pleas, and divisions thereof, and of all courts 144
of record established by law, shall, at stated times, receive, 145
for their services such compensation as ~~may be provided by law,~~ 146
~~which shall not be diminished during their term of office~~ for in 147
Article II, Section 20a of this constitution. The compensation 148
of all judges of the supreme court, except that of the chief 149
justice, shall be the same. The compensation of all judges of 150
the courts of appeals shall be the same. Common pleas judges and 151
judges of divisions thereof, and judges of all courts of record 152
established by law shall receive such compensation as ~~may be~~ 153
~~provided by law~~ for in Article II, Section 20a of this 154
constitution. Judges shall receive no fees or perquisites, nor 155
hold any other office of profit or trust, under the authority of 156
this state, or of the United States. All votes for any judge, 157
for any elective office, except a judicial office, under the 158
authority of this state, given by the general assembly, or the 159
people shall be void. 160

(C) No person shall be elected or appointed to any 161
judicial office if on or before the day when ~~he~~ the person shall 162
assume the office and enter upon the discharge of its duties ~~he~~ 163
the person shall have attained the age of seventy years. Any 164
voluntarily retired judge, or any judge who is retired under 165
this section, may be assigned with ~~his~~ the judge's consent, by 166
the chief justice or acting chief justice of the supreme court 167
to active duty as a judge and while so serving shall receive the 168

established compensation for such office, computed upon a per 169
diem basis, in addition to any retirement benefits to which ~~he~~ 170
the judge may be entitled. Laws may be passed providing 171
retirement benefits for judges. 172

SCHEDULE I 173

The Public Office Compensation Commission shall meet in 174
2015 to review the current compensation of each elected public 175
office in the state. The Commission shall issue a proposed 176
compensation plan and final compensation plan, and the 177
accompanying reports, not later than December 31, 2015, in 178
accordance with the process in Article II, Section 20a of the 179
Constitution. 180

The compensation amounts set forth in the final 181
compensation plan for each elected public office in the state 182
shall take effect on July 1, 2016, unless, before that day, the 183
General Assembly, by a three-fifths vote of the members elected 184
to each house, adopts a concurrent resolution rejecting one or 185
more of the compensation amounts. 186

If the General Assembly rejects a final compensation plan 187
or portion thereof, a member of the General Assembly who, at the 188
time the plan was voted on, voted or would have been entitled to 189
vote thereon, is not entitled to an increase in compensation for 190
the duration of the member's term of office. 191

SCHEDULE II 192

The term of an initial appointment to the Commission 193
begins upon appointment and ends December 31, 2017. 194

If, by November 13, 2015, one or more appointments have 195
not been made to the Commission, a majority of the members of 196
the Commission who have been appointed by that date shall 197

appoint, not later than November 15, 2015, a sufficient number
of individuals to the Commission so that the Commission consists
of nine voting members, and shall notify the Governor, President
of the Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Minority
Leader of the Senate, Minority Leader of the House of
Representatives, and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
appointments.

SCHEDULE III

Some of the proposed amendments to Ohio Constitution,
Article II, Sections 4 and 20, and Article IV, Section 6,
replace gender specific language with gender neutral language.
These amendments are not intended to make substantive changes in
the Ohio Constitution. The gender neutral language shall be
interpreted as a restatement of, and substituted in a continuing
way for, the corresponding gender specific language existing
prior to adoption of the proposal.

EFFECTIVE DATE AND REPEAL

If adopted by a majority of the electors voting on this
proposal, Sections 4, 20, and 31 of Article II, Section 19 of
Article III, and Section 6 of Article IV of the Constitution of
the State of Ohio as amended by this proposal and Section 20a of
Article II of the Constitution of the State of Ohio shall take
effect immediately and existing Sections 4, 20, and 31 of
Article II, Section 19 of Article III, and Section 6 of Article
IV of the Constitution of the State of Ohio are repealed
effective immediately.



Ohio Legislative Service Commission

Resolution Analysis

Jennifer A. Parker

S.J.R. 1

131st General Assembly
(As Introduced)

Sens. Faber, Widener, Patton, Oelslager, Obhof, Williams, Seitz, LaRose, Bacon, Beagle, Hottinger

RESOLUTION SUMMARY

- Creates the Public Office Compensation Commission consisting of nine voting members.
- Requires the Commission, in each even-numbered year, to review the compensation of elected public offices in the state.
- Requires the Commission to create a proposed compensation plan and a report, and to present the plan and report at not less than three public hearings to receive public input.
- Requires the Commission to issue a final compensation plan and a report not later than December 31 of each even-numbered year.
- Allows the General Assembly to reject one or more of the final compensation amounts.
- Provides that the final compensation plan issued by the Commission takes effect July 1 of the following odd-numbered year except insofar as compensation amounts have been rejected by the General Assembly.
- Requires the Commission to create its *initial* final compensation plan not later than December 31, 2015, and provides that the compensation amounts therein take effect July 1, 2016, unless rejected by the General Assembly.
- Specifies that the creation and operation of the Commission does not affect the compensation of nonjudicial elected public offices in municipal corporations and charter counties having home rule.

- Removes the prohibition against General Assembly members receiving "allowances or perquisites" in addition to a fixed compensation.
- Limits the prohibition against General Assembly members receiving in-term increases in compensation to apply only when the General Assembly has, during a member's term, rejected the Commission's final compensation plan.
- Removes the prohibition against compensation of judges of courts of record being diminished during a term of office.
- Eliminates the prohibition against a member of the General Assembly, during the member's term or for one year thereafter, from being appointed to a public office the compensation of which was increased during the member's term.
- Eliminates the prohibition against executive officers' compensation being increased or decreased during the period for which the officer was elected.

CONTENT AND OPERATION

The joint resolution proposes an amendment to the Ohio Constitution that establishes a Public Office Compensation Commission to review and set the compensation of elected public offices, subject to rejection by the General Assembly. The proposal is to be submitted to the electors at the general election to be held on November 3, 2015.

Duties of the Public Office Compensation Commission

The Public Office Compensation Commission is required to meet each even-numbered year to review the current compensation of each elected public office in the state.¹ Currently, the General Assembly establishes, by law, the compensation of all officers,² of all executive officers,³ and of justices of the Supreme Court and judges of the courts of appeals, courts of common pleas, and divisions thereof, and of all courts of record established by law.⁴ Under the proposal, the Commission, instead of the General Assembly, is to establish the compensation of all elected public offices.⁵ When

¹ Ohio Const., art. II, sec. 20a(B)(1).

² Ohio Const., art. II, sec. 20.

³ Ohio Const., art. III, sec. 19.

⁴ Ohio Const., art. IV, sec. 6(B).

⁵ Ohio Const., art. II, sec. 20a(B)(1).

reviewing the current compensation of elected public offices, the Commission must consider factors provided by law, including the amount of compensation paid to similarly skilled individuals in the private sector, the amount of compensation paid to individuals in comparable elected public offices in other states, and the current financial condition of and within Ohio.⁶

After completing its review, the Commission must prepare, by vote of at least five of its members, a proposed compensation plan that sets forth the compensation amounts for each elected public office in the state, and must prepare a report of the proposed compensation plan. The Commission must present the proposed compensation plan and the report at not less than three public hearings in the state to obtain public input regarding the plan. After conducting the public hearings, the Commission must issue, by vote of at least five of its members, a final compensation plan. The Commission must prepare a report of the final compensation plan not later than the last day of December in each even-numbered year. When a proposed or final compensation plan increases or decreases the compensation amount of an elected public office by more than the lesser of 3% or the percentage increase, if any, in the consumer price index,⁷ the Commission must include specific factors that support the increase or decrease in its accompanying report.⁸

Effective date of final compensation plan; rejection of compensation amounts by General Assembly

The compensation amounts set forth in the final compensation plan for each elected public office take effect on the first day of July of the following odd-numbered year unless, before that day, the General Assembly, by a three-fifths vote of the members elected to each house, adopts a concurrent resolution rejecting one or more of the compensation amounts. If the General Assembly rejects a final compensation plan or portion thereof, a member of the General Assembly who, at the time the plan was voted on, voted or would have been entitled to vote on it, is not entitled to an increase in compensation for the duration of the member's term of office.⁹

⁶ Ohio Const., art. II, sec. 20a(B)(1).

⁷ Measured over the 12-month period that ends on the 30th day of September of the immediately preceding year, rounded to the nearest $\frac{1}{10}$ of 1%.

⁸ Ohio Const., art. II, sec. 20a(B)(1).

⁹ Ohio Const., art. II, sec. 20a(B)(2).



Initial actions of the Commission

The Commission must meet in 2015 to review the current compensation of each public office. The proposed and final compensation plans and the accompanying reports must be issued not later than December 31, 2015. The compensation amounts in the initial final compensation plan are to take effect July 1, 2016, unless rejected by the General Assembly as described above. If the General Assembly rejects the initial final compensation plan, or a portion thereof, a member of the General Assembly who, at the time the plan was voted on, voted or would have been entitled to vote on it, is not entitled to an increase in compensation for the duration of the member's term of office.¹⁰

Membership of the Commission

The Commission is to consist of nine members appointed as follows: two by the Governor, two by the President of the Senate, two by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, one by the Minority Leader of the Senate, one by the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, and one by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The following individuals are not eligible to be appointed as a member of the Commission: (1) an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of the state, or a family member, as defined by statute, of an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of the state, (2) an individual who was a candidate for election to public office in the state within 12 months before appointment, or (3) an individual who engages during at least a portion of the individual's time to actively advocate legislation on behalf of another.

Members serve two-year terms and may not serve more than four consecutive terms. The Commission is to select its chairperson by a majority vote. Members do not receive compensation, but must be reimbursed for actual and necessary expenses incurred in the performance of Commission duties. Vacancies on the Commission are to be filled in the manner prescribed for the original appointment.¹¹

Initial appointments

The term of an initial appointment to the Commission is to begin upon appointment and end December 31, 2017. If, by November 13, 2015, one or more appointments have not been made, a majority of the Commission members who have been appointed are to appoint, not later than November 15, 2015, a sufficient number of individuals so that the Commission consists of nine members. The Commission must give notice of the appointments to the Governor, President and Minority Leader of the

¹⁰ Schedule I.

¹¹ Ohio Const., art II, sec. 20a(A).

Senate, Speaker and Minority Leader of the House, and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.¹²

Compensation of charter county or municipal elected officer unaffected

The proposal specifies that the creation and operation of the Commission does not affect the compensation of a county officer elected under a county charter or the compensation of an officer of a municipality elected under the power of local self-government as exercised by a municipality under the Home Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution.¹³

Miscellaneous

The Constitution currently prohibits the compensation of a judge of a court of record from being diminished in term. The proposal removes this prohibition.¹⁴

The Constitution also prohibits the compensation of members of the General Assembly from being changed in term. The proposal removes this prohibition as well.¹⁵ But, as described above, it does specify that if the General Assembly rejects all or a portion of the Commission's final compensation plan, a member who, at the time the plan was voted on, voted or would have been entitled to vote on it, is not entitled to an increase in compensation during the member's term of office.¹⁶

The proposal eliminates the Constitutional prohibition against a member of the General Assembly being appointed to a public office, during the member's term or for one year thereafter, if the compensation of the office was increased during the member's term.¹⁷

The proposal eliminates the prohibition against certain executive officers, during the period for which the officers were elected, from receiving an increase or decrease in compensation. The proposal also requires the General Assembly to set the compensation of all nonelected officers not otherwise provided for in the Constitution,

¹² Schedule II.

¹³ Ohio Const., art. II, sec. 20a(C); Ohio Const., art. X, Secs. 3 and 4 (county home rule); Ohio Const., art. XVIII, secs. 3 and 7 (municipal home rule).

¹⁴ Ohio Const., art. IV, sec. 6.

¹⁵ Ohio Const., art. II, sec. 31.

¹⁶ Ohio Const., art. II, sec. 20a(B)(2).

¹⁷ Ohio Const., art. II, sec. 4.

and specifies that that salary cannot change during the officer's existing term, unless the office is abolished.¹⁸

HISTORY

ACTION	DATE
Introduced	02-02-15

SJR0001-IN-131.docx/emr

¹⁸ Ohio Const., art. II, sec. 20 and art. III, sec. 19.





OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL MODERNIZATION COMMISSION

MEMORANDUM

TO: Chairman Frederick E. Mills and
Members of the Legislative Branch and Executive Branch Committee

CC: Steven C. Hollon, Executive Director and
Shari L. O'Neill, Counsel to the Commission

FROM: Hailey C. Akah, Legal Intern

DATE: March 2, 2015

RE: Comparing State Compensation Commissions

At the request of the Legislative Branch and Executive Branch Committee, this Memorandum compares state compensation commissions for elected officials. First, it outlines the basic tenets of Senate Joint Resolution 1 ("SJR 1"), which would establish the Public Office Compensation Commission for Ohio. The memo then outlines the similarities often seen among state compensation commissions and, the key differences between states as they set compensation policy, and identifies how the proposed Ohio Compensation Commission compares to other state compensation commissions.¹

Summary of Senate Joint Resolution 1

SJR 1 would create the Public Office Compensation Commission ("Compensation Commission"). Proposed SJR 1 would create the Compensation Commission to set the compensation of elected officials in the state of Ohio. The Compensation Commission would consist of nine voting members who are to be appointed in the following manner: two appointed by the Governor, two appointed by the President of the Senate, two appointed by the Speaker of the House, one appointed by the minority leader of the Senate, one appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives, and one appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Members are appointed to terms of two years and may not serve more than four consecutive terms.

Membership on the Compensation Commission would be restricted. Officers and employees of the state, family members of officers and employees of the state, individuals who were candidates for election in the last 12 months, and lobbyists cannot be appointed to the Compensation Commission. The members of the Compensation Commission may not be paid for their work, but would be reimbursed for any Compensation Commission-related spending.

The Compensation Commission would meet in even-numbered years to consider factors relevant to the compensation of elected officials and to create a compensation plan proposal. Relevant factors include: (1) the salaries of similarly-skilled individuals in the private sector; (2) the salaries of individuals in similar public offices in other states; and (3) the current financial condition of and within Ohio. However, the Compensation Commission would not address the compensation of county officers elected under county charter, nor of officers of municipal corporations elected under the power of local self-government.

Once the Compensation Commission has prepared a proposed compensation plan, it must present that plan during at least three public hearings in Ohio. If the pay increase or decrease is either: (1) more than 3 percent; or (2) more than the percentage increase of the consumer price index, the Compensation Commission must include specific factors that support its decision.

Finally, the Compensation Commission, by a majority vote, would issue a final compensation plan no later than December 31 of that even-numbered year. This plan would be effective on July 1 of the following year unless the General Assembly overrides it by concurrent resolution. The General Assembly may reject one or more of the compensation amounts.

Reasons to Establish a Compensation Commission

Based on a survey of commentary by legislators in states with compensation commissions, compensation commissions are created for several reasons. First, it is politically unpopular for legislatures to raise their own wages. However, under most state constitutions, it is the responsibility of the legislature to set the compensation rates for public officials. Because it is a political challenge, most legislatures do not raise wages often. This leads to low compensation that, in many instances, does not continue to rise with inflation. Second, because compensation is low, public officials worry about lack of diversity in public offices. It may be the case that only the wealthy and retired, for example, are able to accept a legislator's salary.

Similarities among State Compensation Commissions

The compensation commissions of the following 16 states were surveyed²: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia.³ Among these states, there were notable similarities. For a side-by-side comparison, please see a comparison chart provided at Attachment A.

First, membership on compensation commissions is often approached in a similar way. Members are appointed, can be reappointed for a number of terms, and can be removed for cause. Additionally, members of compensation commissions typically cannot be elected officials and cannot be paid for their service. The notable exception is the Arkansas Independent Citizens Commission, which may elect to pay its members a stipend of \$85 a day or less. Thus far, it has not elected to do so, but it has only been in existence since November 2014.

Second, the system for recommending compensation rates is similar among the states. In most cases, pay rates are proposed at the end of the calendar year and go into effect at the beginning of the next fiscal year. This recommendation system, and the common aspects of membership, are also true of the proposed Compensation Commission.

Finally, the process of appointment is similar among a majority of the states. In most cases, states allow officials from each branch of government to appoint members to the compensation commission. Many states also have some bipartisanship requirement, whether in the members of the compensation commission or in the makeup of the appointers. The proposed Compensation Commission follows this pattern. However, there are two notable exceptions to this general rule. First, the compensation commissions in California and Michigan are entirely appointed by the governors of those states. Second, both Missouri and Oregon appoint citizen members to their compensation commissions. The Secretary of State in each of these states is charged with appointing one member from each congressional district. These members are chosen by lot from the state voter registration records. However, states that utilize citizen members are recent exceptions to the general rule.

Differences between State Compensation Commissions

The Legislature's Role in Setting Compensation

The policy choice most closely related to the goals of compensation commissions generally concerns the role of the legislature in setting compensation rates. One group of states vests the authority to set the salaries of public officials in the compensation commission entirely. This group includes Delaware, California, Maryland, Missouri, Utah, and Washington. In these states, the recommendations of the compensation commission go into effect without any action by the state legislature. In these instances, the legislature can disapprove the recommendations by joint resolution or the citizens can change the recommendations by referendum petition. The proposed Compensation Commission falls into this group.

This relationship between the legislature and the compensation commission resolves many of the problems that plague legislatures when they are required to pass their own salary increases. The press coverage of salary increases tends not to focus on political issues, but is neutral and factual, when the increases are implemented by an external compensation commission. A newspaper in Utah called a 2015 pay increase for its governor “long overdue.”⁴ Maryland pay increases received similar positive press in 2013.⁵ In fact, in most instances, there is little press at all. The only extensive political press coverage of a state in this group occurred in Missouri when the Missouri General Assembly disapproved a pay increase by joint resolution.⁶

The other group of states, including Arizona, Connecticut, Michigan, and Minnesota, require the legislature to pass the compensation plan recommended by the compensation commission. The compensation plan in these instances has no authority until it is voted into law by the legislature.

These states experience fewer of the benefits associated with compensation commissions. Pay raises for public offices are still politically difficult and, therefore, happen rarely.⁷

Legal Authority: Constitution or Legislation

One key difference among the surveyed states is whether the compensation commission is established under the state constitution or by statute. Some states, including Arkansas, California, Washington, and West Virginia, have established their compensation commissions by constitutional provision alone. Arkansas is the newest member of this group, establishing its compensation commission in November 2014. It appears that the Compensation Commission would be in this group as well.

Other states have created their compensation commissions through legislation alone. These states include Connecticut, Delaware, Oregon, and Utah. Statutes, in comparison to constitutional provisions, tend to be longer and more detailed. While constitutional provisions use broader terms that leave more room for interpretation, statutes often include specific lists and exact definitions. One prominent example of this distinction occurs when defining the jurisdiction of the compensation commission, discussed further in the section below.

Still other states have created compensation commissions using a combination of a broad constitutional provision and enabling legislation. These states, including Hawaii, Idaho, and Michigan, have passed short, less-descriptive constitutional provisions. These provisions also contain language that calls on the legislature to pass additional legislation. For instance, Article IV, Section 12 of the Michigan Constitution states that the governor shall appoint seven members to the compensation commission and their qualifications “may be determined by law.” The legislature is then required to act. These statutes expound on the constitutional provision in definition and detail.

The Compensation Commission’s Jurisdiction: Specific or General

Another key difference between states is the specificity with which the source document explains the jurisdiction of the compensation commission. One group of states list specific offices over which their compensation commissions have jurisdiction. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Oregon, Utah, and West Virginia are members of this group. These states fall into two subcategories. States in the first subcategory have established their compensation commissions legislatively. Statutes typically include more detailed information than constitutional provisions. Therefore, these statutes are explicit about which offices the compensation commission may include in its recommendation. In the second subcategory, states have limited the scope of the compensation commission, and therefore, the jurisdiction is clear and specific. For instance, West Virginia has enacted the West Virginia’s Citizens Legislative Compensation Commission, and the scope is limited to members of the Legislature. This is another way to establish a compensation commission with a specific jurisdiction.

Other states set out the jurisdiction of their compensation commissions using general phrases. These states include Arkansas, Michigan, Missouri, and Washington. General phrases are typically utilized in constitutional provisions. A common example was enacted in Washington. The Washington Citizens' Commission on Salaries for Elected Officials has jurisdiction over the "[s]alaries for the members of the legislature, elected officials of the executive branch of state government, and judges of the state's supreme court, court of appeals, superior courts, and district courts." These categories are not further expounded upon. However, in Michigan, the State Constitution does list a few specific offices, including the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, and Secretary of State. It may be inferred, however, that these offices are necessarily included in the phrase "elected officials of the executive branch," which other states in this group utilize. Although these offices are listed by name, they add little additional clarity to the jurisdiction of the compensation commission. If enacted in its current form, SJR 1 would establish this type of compensation commission, defining its jurisdiction using general phrases.

A third type of jurisdictional phrase exists in only one state surveyed: California. The source document for the California Citizen's Compensation Commission, Article III, Section 8 of the California Constitution, uses the phrase "state officer" throughout. This phrase is then defined in the text of the Constitution itself. The section defines "state officer" as "the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Controller, Insurance Commissioner, Secretary of State, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Treasurer, member of the State Board of Equalization, and Member of the Legislature." This approach to establishing jurisdiction is more similar in effect to the first group of states, which list specific offices in its source statute. However, California includes such a list in its Constitution.

Conclusion

Thank you for the opportunity to provide an overview of the different types of compensation commissions that exist throughout the United States. If the committee has any additional questions concerning compensation commissions, I am happy to follow up with additional research.

Endnotes

¹ Citations to the constitutional provisions and statutes that contain information on the compensation commissions for each state can be found in the chart provided as Attachment A.

² According to Senate Chief Legal Counsel Frank Strigari's testimony during the February Meeting of the Legislative Branch and Executive Branch Committee, there are 19 states with compensation commissions. In the interest of time, this review addresses most, but not all of these states.

³ Indiana has had a compensation commission in the past, but it has since been repealed. The Indiana General Assembly established the Public Officers Compensation Advisory Commission in 2004 by statute. Ind. Code § 2-5-1.5. That compensation commission was then repealed in 2011 as part of an omnibus bill that eliminated dozens of councils, commissions, and boards. Between its creation in 2004 and its termination in 2011, the compensation commission did not meet. In 2012, Indiana HB 1002 passed through the General Assembly and was signed into law.

It was another omnibus bill that eliminated dozens of additional councils, commissions, and boards, but in fact reinstated the Compensation Advisory Commission. Ind. Code § 2-5-1.6. However, the compensation commission was repealed again on March 24, 2013. The Indiana General Assembly now passes legislation to set compensation for elected officials.

The reasons for this tumultuous history are uncertain. No case law exists on the matter and little press was generated by the repeals and reinstatement. However, if this Committee finds it beneficial to understand the challenges faced in Indiana, more comprehensive research can be done.

⁴ Brad Wilson, *Pay Raise for Governor Long Overdue*, STANDARD EXAMINER, February 23, 2015.

⁵ Len Lazarick, *Next Governor Should Get 20% Pay Raise to \$180,000, Commission Recommends*, MARYLAND REPORTER, December 22, 2013.

⁶ Although Democrats in the legislature approved the pay increase, Republicans were concerned about the widening pay gap between legislators and legislative staff. Alex Stuckey, *Missouri Lawmakers Reject Pay Raise*, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, January 30, 2015.

⁷ For example, the current Connecticut General Assembly is taking steps to raise compensation by 10 percent for all elected officers statewide. Democrats wanted to implement the raises, but Republicans were against it. Senator Rob Kane, a Republican, felt that raising compensation showed concern for the General Assembly itself rather than for its constituents. This is a political issue that was not circumvented by the creation of a compensation commission.

Arizona faced a similar problem in 2014. Article V, Section 12 of the Arizona Constitution establishes a compensation commission that advises the governor, who reports recommendations to the legislature. The governor's recommendations become law without action by the legislature. However, the recommendations are submitted to the voters for approval at the next regular general election. Typically, pay increases are rejected by the voters. This relationship between compensation commission, governor, legislature, and electorate has retained the politicization of compensation for elected officials. It has also left Arizona legislators in a difficult financial position. An increase in legislature salaries from \$24,000 a year to \$35,000 a year was put on the ballot in November 2014, and it was disapproved by the voters.

Attachment A

Compensation Commission State Comparison Chart				
State:	Appointments Made By:	Source Document:	Jurisdiction:	Power to Enact:
Arizona Commission on Salaries for Elective State Officers	Three Branches 5 members: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governor (2) • Speaker of the House (1) • President of the Senate (1) • Chief Justice (1) 	Constitution Ariz. Const. art. V, § 12	Vague “Those holding elective state offices” Ariz. Const. art. V, § 12	Voters The recommendations go before the voters for a vote.
Arkansas Independent Citizens Commission	Three Branches 7 members: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governor (2) • Speaker of the House (2) • President of the Senate (2) • Chief Justice (1) 	Constitution Ark. Const. art. XIX, § 31	Specific List Ark. Const. art. XIX, § 31(d)	Compensation Commission Ark. Const. art. XIX, § 31(j)
California California Citizen’s Compensation Commission	Governor Only 7 members: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governor (7) 	Constitution Cal. Const. art. III, § 8	Broad Term Defined "State officer" defined in Cal. Const. art. III, § 8(l)	Compensation Commission Cal. Const. art. III, § 8(g)

Connecticut Compensation Commission for Elected State Officers and Judges	Two Branches 11 members: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governor (3) • Speaker of the House (2) • President of the Senate (2) • Minority Leader of the House (2) • Minority Leader of the Senate (2) 	Statute Conn. Gen. Stat. § 2-9a	Specific List Conn. Gen. Stat. § 2-9a(2)(b)	The Legislature The recommended compensation plan will not go into effect without a vote from the General Assembly.
Delaware Delaware Compensation Commission	Two Branches + Private Sector 5 voting members: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governor (2) • Speaker of the House (1) • President of the Senate (1) • President of the Delaware Business Roundtable (1) 	Statute Del. Code tit. 29, § 3301 - 3304	Specific List Del. Code tit. 29, § 3303	Compensation Commission Recommendations take effect unless the General Assembly passes a joint resolution to reject it at least 30 days before the end of its session.
Hawaii Commission on Salaries	Three Branches 7 voting members: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governor (2) • Speaker of the House (2) • President of the Senate (2) • Chief Justice (1) 	Constitution Haw. Const. § art. 16, § 3.5	Categories Haw. Const. § art. 16, § 3.5	Compensation Commission Automatically becomes law unless the legislature disapproves, but new rate does not apply to the current legislature.

Idaho The Committee	Two Branches 6 voting members: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governor (3) • Supreme Court (3) 	Constitution + Statute Idaho Const. art. III, § 23 Idaho Code § 67-406b	Narrow Scope The Legislature Only Idaho Code § 67-406b	Compensation Commission The Committee's rates will go into effect unless the legislature rejects or reduces them by concurrent resolution.
Maryland General Assembly Compensation Commission	Two Branches 9 voting members: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governor (5) • Speaker of the House (2) • President of the Senate (2) 	Constitution Const. art. III, § 15	Narrow Scope The Legislature Only	Compensation Commission The resolution, with any reductions that shall have been concurred in by joint resolution of the General Assembly, shall take effect and have the force of law
Michigan State Officers Compensation Commission	Governor Only 7 members: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governor (7) 	Constitution + Statutes Mich. Const. § art. 4, § 12 Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 15.211 – 15.218	Categories Mich. Const. § art. 4, § 12	The Legislature These recommendations only become salaries if the legislature adopts them by concurrent resolution.

Minnesota State Compensation Council	<p>Three Branches</p> <p>16 voting members:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governor (8) • Speaker of the House (2) • President of the Senate (2) • Minority Leader of the House (1) • Minority Leader of the Senate (1) • Chief Justice (2) <p>The Governor appoints one member from each congressional district.</p>	<p>Statute</p> <p>Minn. Stat. § 15A.082</p>	<p>Categories</p> <p>Minn. Stat. § 15A.082(2)</p>	<p>Compensation Commission</p> <p>Minn. Stat. § 15A.082(3)</p>
Missouri Missouri Citizens' Commission on Compensation for Elected Officials	<p>Three Branches + Citizens Appointed by Secretary of State from Voter Roll</p> <p>21 voting members:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governor with advice and consent of the Senate (12) • Supreme Court (1) • Secretary of State (1 per congressional district) 	<p>Constitution</p> <p>Mo. Const. art. XIII, § 3</p>	<p>Categories</p> <p>Mo. Const. art. XIII, § 3</p>	<p>Compensation Commission</p> <p>Mo. Const. art. XIII, § 3</p>

Oregon The Public Officials Compensation Commission	Three Branches + Citizens Appointed by Secretary of State from Voter Roll 11 voting members: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governor (2) • Speaker of the House (1) • President of the Senate (1) • Chief Justice (1) • Secretary of State (6) 	Statute Or. Rev. Stat. § 292.907	Specific List Or. Rev. Stat. § 292.930	Compensation Commission Or. Rev. Stat. § 292.912
Utah State Elected Official and Judicial Compensation Commission	Two Branches, Members, and State Bar Commission 6 voting members: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governor (1) • Speaker of the House (1) • President of the Senate (1) • Members appointed by Governor, Speaker, and President (2) • State Bar Commission (1) 	Statute Utah Code Ann. § 67-8 Utah Elected Official and Judicial Salary Act	Categories Utah Code Ann. § 67-8-5	Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary The Commission shall “consult and advise with, and make recommendation to” each branch of government. It is unclear which branch has the final say on the recommendations. Utah Code Ann. § 67-8-5

Washington Washington Citizens' Commission on Salaries for Elected Officials	None Listed	Constitution Wash. Const. art. XXVIII, § 1	Broad Category Determines salaries for members of the legislature, elected officials of the executive branch of state government, and judges of the state's supreme court, court of appeals, superior courts, and district courts	Compensation Commission The Commission has the authority to set the salary of all public officials, and that salary can only be changed by referendum petition.
West Virginia The Citizens Legislative Compensation Commission	Governor Only 7 members: • Governor (7)	Constitution W. Va. Const. art. VI, § 33	Narrow Scope Legislators only	The Legislature The Legislature must enact the resolution into law and may reduce, but not increase any item established in such resolution.



Representative Kathleen Clyde
75th House District

Ohio Needs Congressional Redistricting Reform

Testimony of Rep. Kathleen Clyde
before the Ohio Constitutional Modernization Commission
Legislative and Executive Branch Committee
April 9, 2015

Good morning Chair Mills and Vice Chair Brooks and members of the Legislative and Executive Branch Committee. I along with my colleague Representative Mike Curtin recently introduced a congressional redistricting reform proposal, House Joint Resolution 2, in the House of Representatives. Soon after introducing it, we asked to present the proposal to this committee because you spent a lot of time hearing all about state and congressional redistricting these last two years. This panel has undoubtedly gained more knowledge than its members probably thought possible about this important issue and the potential for reform in Ohio at the state and congressional levels.

HJR 2, our congressional redistricting proposal, closely mirrors HJR 12, the state legislative redistricting reform proposal that passed with huge bipartisan support last General Assembly. In the coming months, we would like to see this committee and the full Constitutional Modernization Commission approve this plan and recommend reform of the way we draw congressional districts.

The work done by your committee to advance a state legislative redistricting reform proposal during the last General Assembly was key to the ultimate passage of HJR 12 which will appear before Ohio voters this fall. But even if the state reform proposal is approved, Ohio will still be left with a broken system of drawing congressional districts. As you know, the legislature removed congressional redistricting from the reform proposal it passed in December with the promise of considering it this year instead. We ask that your committee add its wisdom and expertise to the discussion of this important matter.

Gerrymandering of the state legislative and congressional districts makes our lawmaking bodies less responsive to the will of the public and less representative of Ohioans' preferences in how we govern ourselves. No issue is more important to the health of our democracy than fair redistricting at both the state and congressional level.

Allow me to describe key points of the proposal:

www.ohiohouse.gov
77 S. High Street
Columbus, Ohio 43215-6111

Committees:

Finance
Finance Subcommittee on Transportation
Government Accountability & Oversight, *Ranking Member*
Public Utilities
Ohio Constitutional Modernization Commission

Contact Information:

Office: 614-466-2004
Toll-Free: 1-800-282-0253
Fax: 614-719-3968
Email: Rep75@ohiohouse.gov

- The proposal adds bipartisanship by creating a seven-member panel with at least two members from the minority party. (Four legislative members – two of whom are members of the minority party in each chamber – the governor, state auditor and secretary of state.)
- Two minority votes would be needed to adopt the legislative boundaries for a 10-year period.
- If the new panel fails to reach agreement, the maps would need to be redrawn in four years. During that time, elections could bring new members to the commission. The members would then reconvene to try again.
- If there is a second impasse, the new map will go into effect for the remaining 6 years, but must adhere to tougher standards.
- The plan gives the Ohio Supreme Court clear guidance on how to determine if maps were drawn properly.
- The principal criteria will protect communities by strictly minimizing the number of splits of counties, municipalities and contiguous townships, with priority given first to large counties, then smaller counties, then municipalities, and then contiguous townships.
- For the first time, the Ohio Constitution will require representational fairness, and state that "No General Assembly district plan shall be drawn primarily to favor or disfavor a political party."


What I've just described probably sounds familiar because it is exactly like the state reform proposal that the General Assembly passed last year. This final point differs from that plan out of necessity:

- State districts may have a population deviation of up to 5% from the ideal population of a district. But congressional districts are required to contain nearly equal numbers of people and this proposal reflects that difference.

One final point that we had to deal with was what happens if the U.S. Supreme Court issues a decision in *Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission* that is inconsistent with this proposal. In that case, the proposal is drafted so that the power to draw the lines may stay with the legislature. However, the legislature would have to adhere to the new rules and fairness criteria in drawing the districts.

Thank you for the contribution that your committee has made to the work of Ohio redistricting reform so far. We look forward to continuing that work with you on the important issue of congressional redistricting reform.

You will now hear from Representative Curtin about the need for reform and I will stay for any discussion or questions you may have. Thank you.





*Forging a partnership between farmers and consumers.
•Working together for Ohio's farmers•*

**Ohio Farm Bureau Federation Testimony Before
The Legislative Branch And Executive Branch Committee On The Subject Of Term Limits
Tony Seegers, Director Of State Policy
April 9, 2015**

Chairman Mills, Vice Chair Brooks, and members of the Legislative Branch and Executive Branch Committee, my name is Tony Seegers and I am the director of state policy for the Ohio Farm Bureau. Thank you for the opportunity to provide what will prove to be brief testimony today on Farm Bureau's policy regarding term limits for members of the General Assembly.

Before I discuss our position on the subject, it is important to have an overview of how Farm Bureau develops its policies. Our public policy development process allows our members to fully engage in shaping Farm Bureau's objectives. We have county farm bureaus representing members in all 88 counties. These county farm bureaus submit public policy recommendations covering county, state and federal issues that are approved at their annual meetings held August through October. Once approved, the county farm bureaus submit these recommendations to be reviewed by the state policy development committee and then they are voted on at OFBF's annual meeting.

From this process, an extensive policy book is developed which covers issues ranging from nutrient management to food quality and safety to the topic at hand, term limits. This is a yearly practice and our policy book sets forth the positions to pursue so we can fulfill our mission for that year. It is what guides OFBF's advocacy at the statehouse and in the halls of congress.

Our policy on term limits states,

We support extending the term limit for state legislators to 12 years.

We support extending the term length for a state representative from two years to four years and extending the term length for a state senator from four to six years.

- Term Limits # 121, lines 1-3.

As you can see, Farm Bureau supports the overall concept of extending term limits for members of the General Assembly from the current eight year structure to twelve years. However, this policy does not speak to a lifetime limit of twelve years of service in the legislature.

Additionally, our policy supports extending the actual length of the individual terms for representatives from the current two years per election to four years. For senators, we support increasing the individual term length per election from four years to six years. The aggregate limit remains twelve years.

Our overall support for increasing term limits to twelve years is based on the recognition that limiting the number of years of service reduces the expertise that is developed with longevity in the House and Senate. It is more difficult for members to become "subject-matter experts" under our current constitutional framework. The General Assembly, and ultimately the public, has lost the institutional memory that years of service brought. In fact, when they became effective in 2001, term limits resulted in approximately 648 years of combined service to leave with those members.

As the Committee continues to review this issue, it is important to consider that other factors, such as the redistricting process, could impact Farm Bureau's position on term limits.

Thank you again Mr. Chairman and members of the committee for the opportunity to testify on behalf of Farm Bureau. I will be happy to answer any questions the committee may have.

Senator Tavares offers the following amendment for Option 1:

Add to the recommendation section after current text within that section:

Finally, the committee recommends that should the legislature act on this proposal, it should be slated for an election in 2016 or later.